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Decentralization is among the most important global trends of the new century, yet there is still no 
consensus on how to design political institutions to realize its benefits.  In this paper, we investigate the 
political conditions under which decentralization will improve the delivery of public goods.   We begin by 
incorporating insights from political science and economics into a rigorous and formal extension of the 
“decentralization theorem”.  Our extension assumes inter-jurisdictional spillovers and suggests that the 
interaction of democratic decentralization (popularly elected sub-national governments) and party 
centralization (the power of national party leaders over subnational office-seekers) will produce the best 
outcomes for public service delivery.  To test this argument empirically, we make use of a new dataset of 
sub-national political institutions created for this project. Our analyses, which allow us to examine 
educational outcomes in more than 125 countries across more than 25 years, provide support for our 
theoretical expectations. 
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As more and more of the world’s states devolve power and resources to sub-national governments, 
decentralization is emerging as one of the most important global trends of the new century.  Yet there is 
still no consensus concerning the benefits of decentralization and how to design institutions that can realize 
these benefits.  In this paper, we investigate the political conditions under which this trend towards 
decentralization will improve the delivery of public goods.  We begin by incorporating insights from 
political science and economics into a rigorous and formal extension of the “decentralization theorem”.  
This theorem, which points to the efficiency benefits of sub-national provision of public goods, was first 
developed by Oates (1972) and has influenced virtually all of the literature over the past four decades.   
In his theorem, Oates assumes, among other things, the absence of inter-jurisdictional spillovers in 
the centralized provision of local public goods.  Our extension goes beyond Oates by producing a “strong 
decentralization theorem” in which the provision of local public goods by a system of sub-national 
governments can be welfare superior to centralized provision even under spillovers of local public 
spending. Further, it finds that these beneficial outcomes for public service delivery will hold when 
democratic decentralization (i.e. the creation of popularly elected sub-national governments) is combined 
with party centralization (i.e. the power of national party leaders to nominate candidates for sub-national 
office).  Democratic decentralization creates the accountability necessary for efficient public goods 
provision, while party centralization increases local governments’ incentives to provide public goods with 
spillover effects.  We also find that democratic decentralization combined with party decentralization and 
open primaries leads to the hypothesized benefits of decentralization, but that democratic decentralization 
and party decentralization with closed primaries, in general, does not. 
 To test these arguments empirically, we make use of a new dataset of sub-national political 
institutions created for this project. Up to this point, scholars interested in sub-national political institutions 
have been forced to focus on single cases (especially the United States) or to assume that national level 
political institutions across countries are replicated at the sub-national level.  Our new dataset allows us to 
examine how the structure of municipal politics influences educational outcomes (our proxy for public 
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goods provision) in more than 125 countries across more than 25 years.  This empirical analysis, to our 
knowledge the broadest quantitative exploration of sub-national politics in the literature, provides support 
for our theoretical expectations. 
In the scholarly world, our project has the potential to provide a new, interdisciplinary 
understanding of the implications of decentralization, overcoming some of the gap between work in 
political science and economics.  In addition, we hope that our dataset will be of use to future studies that 
relate political institutions to outcomes at the sub-national level.  Moreover, our project has the potential to 
influence thinking in the broader community of development practitioners.  In the developing world, 
decentralization reforms have been strongly encouraged and assisted by the efforts of bilateral donor 
agencies and international financial institutions, many of which have made decentralization promotion a 
priority.  These agencies, in turn, have been spurred on in their efforts by much of the scholarly literature, 
which emphasizes the beneficial effects of decentralization for the provision of public goods.  Our project 
has the potential to provide a better understanding of which types of political institutions may be necessary 
for decentralization reforms to produce fuller results.   
 
Review of the Literature 
As noted above, decentralization is becoming a prominent global trend; countries which have 
engaged in decentralization reforms include China, Indonesia, South Africa, India, the United Kingdom, 
and many others.  These reforms, at least in the developing world, have been supported both by the aid 
dollars of multilateral and bilateral agencies such as the World Bank and USAID, and by the research 
findings of many scholars.  Central to these positive scholarly judgments is the “decentralization theorem,” 
which was developed by Oates (1972) and states that “. . . in the absence of cost-savings from the 
centralized provision of a (local public) good and of inter-jurisdictional externalities, the level of welfare 
will always be at least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption are provided 
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in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of consumption is maintained across all 
jurisdictions”(p.54). 
As the process of decentralization has continued apace, however, some scholars have begun to 
question whether devolving authority to regional and local governments is a universal good.  Among other 
things, they have pointed out that Oates, in developing his famous theorem, assumed a benevolent, welfare-
maximizing government.  While this assumption may have been useful for creating a simple and elegant 
theory of decentralization, it hardly accords with empirical realities.  More to the point, it begs the question 
of how different political processes and institutions might shape the fiscal choices made by policy makers. 
While these problems have been increasingly acknowledged and confronted in the “second generation” 
research on decentralization, there is still little systematic work on which political institutions lead to the 
social welfare gains expected of decentralization by Oates (1972).
2
 
 We begin our exploration of the existing literature with an examination of what economists and 
political scientists (sometimes on parallel tracks) have said about decentralization and its efficiency 
implications.  We then move to the broader literature on political institutions, party organization, and public 
goods provision, nearly all of which has developed with reference to national governments and apart from 
the study of decentralization.  We conclude our review of the literature by highlighting the relative absence 
of work that considers how specific political institutions such as electoral rules and local representation 
might mediate the effects of decentralization on efficiency outcomes. 
 Modern research on decentralization began with Tiebout’s landmark 1956 study, which argued that 
a decentralized system of public service delivery can maximize efficiency by allowing government services 
to vary according to the preferences of citizens in different jurisdictions.  Oates picked up on this idea and 
qualified it in his 1972 formulation of the decentralization theorem, and scholars have since spent 
significant time improving or critiquing his argument and testing its empirical merit.  For example, Breton 
(2002), Treisman (2007), Lockwood (2002), and Besley and Coate (2003) have examined whether central 
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 Rethinking the Political Economy of Decentralization 5 
governments could themselves target public goods delivery to regional preferences, while Bardhan (2002) 
and Manor (1999) are skeptical that individuals will move to regions that provide the policies they prefer.  
Others assert that decentralization increases opportunities for corruption (Treisman 2000, 2007; Tanzi 
2002) and can be counter-productive if sub-national civil servants are not sufficiently professionalized 
(Shah 2003, Manor 1999). 
 Another group of economists (e.g. Weingast 1995) emphasizes the utility of decentralization 
because it generates a healthy competition among jurisdictions.  Those that are most efficient at public 
good delivery will find new citizens, they argue, whereas those that govern poorly will find their 
populations and tax bases shriveled.  Of course, like the arguments made by Tiebout and Oates, this 
argument has attracted its share of critics, especially among those who fear that decentralization could 
produce an inequitable distribution of goods (Prud’Homme 1995), exacerbate regional enmities (Treisman 
1999, von Braun and Grote 2002), or lead to local elite capture (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000).  Many 
scholars are also concerned about the possible negative impact of decentralization for a country’s fiscal 
balances. For example, Triesman (2000) and Wibbels (2000) find an empirical connection between 
federalism and inflation. 
 Despite the critics, most scholarship in economics and political science, following in the tradition of 
Tiebout, Oates, and Weingast, has viewed decentralization positively.  For example, many scholars believe 
that decentralization has a salutary effect on corruption by promoting transparency and accountability 
(Manor 1999, Gurgur and Shah 2002, Crook 2003).  Others have highlighted ways in which some of the 
potential drawbacks of decentralization can be alleviated.  For example, Rodden (2006) recommends that 
central governments follow a no-bailout policy without respect to sub-national authorities, thereby forcing 
them to internalize the consequences of their fiscal behavior.   
 On the empirical side, evidence for the proposed link between decentralization and efficiency has 
been mixed.   Among the skeptics, Strumpf et al. (1999) find little evidence that decentralization in Uganda 
has improved health outcomes, Davoodi and Zou (1998) believe that devolving power to sub-national 
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governments slows economic growth in developing countries, Schwartz, Guilkey, and Racelis (2002) argue 
that decentralization reforms increased health expenditures in the Philippines but resulted in a shift away 
from the provision of public health resources, and Parry (1997) is skeptical that decentralization in Chile 
has improved educational outcomes.  On the positive side, Lewis (1998) associates improved water 
delivery with decentralization in Kenya, Habibi et al. (2003) point to evidence that strong sub-national 
government reduced infant mortality in Argentina, and Yilmaz (1999), separating federal and unitary 
systems, sees a connection between decentralization and economic growth.  Studies of Bolivia (Faguet and 
Sanchez 2008), Argentina (Habibi et al. 2003), and Indonesia (Simatupang 2009), as well as cross-national 
quantitative analyses (Heredia 2006), also point to improved educational outcomes with decentralization.  
 A reasonable summary, then, is that most scholars continue to see decentralization as a route to 
improving the delivery of public goods, but with a number of significant caveats (see Hankla 2009).  If the 
benefits of decentralization are indeed conditional on other factors, something that many scholars are 
beginning to suspect, it could help account for the mixed empirical findings outlined above.  Thus far, 
however, the literature has spent little time considering how political institutions might matter in mediating 
the effects of devolving power to sub-national governments.  To lay the groundwork for incorporating these 
institutions into our argument, we turn now to a consideration of the broader literature on institutions and 
governance in political science.    
Political scientists have long investigated the implications of different institutional configurations 
for the delivery of public goods, although their efforts have focused almost exclusively on national 
governments.  Most scholars in this area agree, at least implicitly, that the political institutions likely to 
produce positive outcomes are those which expose leaders to popular democratic pressures while insulating 
them from particularistic interest groups.  In making variations of this broad argument, researchers have 
investigated the impact of a number of specific institutions (e.g., electoral systems, legislative-executive 
relations, legislative and coalition party fragmentation) on a wide variety of policy outcomes (e.g., free 
trade, balanced budgets, energy conservation).  To take some examples, Rogowski (1987) draws an 
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association between a proportional electoral system with large electoral districts and free trade policies.  
Other political scientists have found evidence that strong, democratic executives are more likely to provide 
public goods such as free trade (O’Halloran 1994, Nielson 2003), economic liberalization (Haggard and 
Kaufman 1995), and balanced budgets (Hallerberg and Marier 2004) than their less insulated counterparts.  
In addition, many scholars have associated balanced budgets with low levels of legislative and 
governmental party fragmentation (e.g. Roubini and Sachs 1989, Volkerink and de Haan 2001).   
 The impact of political party organization on policy outcomes, one of the central concerns of this 
article, has been much less thoroughly explored in the literature.  The little research that has considered 
party organization has linked a more centralized structure (with empowered national elites) to public goods 
provision.  Hankla (2006) and Nielson (2003), for example, argue that democracies with centralized 
political parties are more likely to adopt free trade policies, and Hallerberg and Marier (2004) find a 
connection between centralized parties and balanced budget in Latin America.  Similarly, Hicken and 
Simmons (2008) argue that that education spending undertaken by decentralized parties is more 
particularistic and less effective.  The link is simply that party centralization shifts power from local elites, 
who might be tempted to shore-up their support with particularistic goods, to national party leaders, who 
have electoral incentives to consider the aggregate national interest. 
While nearly all of the research relating party structures with public goods delivery concerns the 
national level, some scholars have investigated the causal relationship between party and party system 
centralization on the one hand and the empowerment of sub-national governments on the other.  For 
example, Chhibber and Kollman (2004) make the case that countries devolving more powers to the 
subnational level are likely to have more localized party systems, while Fabre et al. (2005) find that such 
countries will also be characterized by more decentralized parties.  Garman, Haggard, and Willis (2001) 
argue for the same relationship moving in the opposite direction; for them the decentralization of parties is 
likely to drive greater fiscal decentralization.  By contrast, Eaton (2004) and Dickovick (2011) find that the 
choice to empower sub-national governments can be driven by the incentives of national party leaders. 
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Other scholars have addressed the question of whether and how party structures can contribute to 
(or undermine) the stability of federalism.  Undoubtedly William Riker is the most prominent scholar to 
have taken up this question, arguing in his classic 1964 book that party centralization is among the most 
important drivers of federal centralization as a whole.  Extending that argument to the United States, Riker 
contends in his 1987 book that the American “decentralized party system is the main protector of the 
integrity of states in our federalism” (p. 221).3  By contrast, Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova (2004) 
emphasize the benefits of more integrated parties, making the case that party systems which successfully 
link the national and sub-national levels of government are the best guarantors of a stable federal system. 
While all of these scholars have improved our understanding of how partisan and sub-national 
institutions interact, their focus has not been on connecting particular sub-national political institutions with 
public goods provision.  Indeed, there are very few systematic studies in the literature that make this 
connection, but it is worth highlighting three influential analyses here.  First, Erik Wibbels argues in his 
2005 book that the presence of centralized parties facilitates the efforts of national leaders to push sub-
national governments into market reforms.  Second, R. Douglas Hecock (2006) finds a positive relationship 
between sub-national political competition and educational spending in Mexico.  Third, and perhaps most 
related to our own work, Rubin Enikolopov and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2007) conclude, after a cross-
national empirical study, that devolving fiscal authority to sub-national governments is more likely to 
improve public good (in this case, education) delivery when parties are centralized.   
Despite some overlap with our interests here, however, there are a number of significant differences 
between our argument and those set forth by these scholars.  Turning first to Wibbels (2005), his research 
focuses on party centralization as a means of national control within a decentralized political system, on not 
on the incentives such structures create for internalizing externalities.  In a similar vein, Hecock (2006) is 
more interested in the level of partisan competition than in the questions of party organization that we study 
here.   
                                                          
3
 See also Volden 2004 for an excellent summary of Riker’s thought on Federalism. 
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Moreover, in contrast to Enikolopov and Zhuravshaya, we consider here the interaction between 
party centralization and democratic centralization rather than that between party centralization and fiscal 
centralization, so our theory is significantly different.  In addition, we develop our argument formally using 
the decentralization theorem as a base, an approach which gives us more opportunity to leave our mark on 
the fundamental theory of decentralization.  Finally, we believe that our data, which measures party 
decentralization more directly (Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 2007 use party fragmentation in the national 
legislature) and at the sub-national level, more closely hews to theory.  We will also make use of additional 
control variables for political institutions at the sub-national level and of educational indicators for the 
dependent variables that pick-up more directly on educational outcomes. 
To summarize, then, the purpose of our research is to merge insights from political science with the 
decentralization literature outlined above, all to identify the political conditions needed for realizing the 
benefits of decentralization.  We turn to developing our theory in the next section. 
 
Development of the Theory 
 In developing our theory, we begin with the decentralization theorem and expand it formally to 
address the implications of different institutional configurations for its efficiency predictions.  More 
specifically, we consider four distinct cases:  
(1) countries that are democratically decentralized (i.e. they have democratically elected sub-national 
governments) and party decentralized (i.e. national leaders lack the power to select candidates for 
these sub-national elections); 
(2) countries that are democratically centralized (i.e. they have no elected sub-national governments) 
but party decentralized (i.e. national leaders lack the power to nominate candidates for 
constituency elections to the national legislature); 
(3) countries that are democratically decentralized (i.e. they have elected sub-national governments) 
but party centralized (i.e. national party leaders select candidates for sub-national elections); and 
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(4) countries that are democratically centralized (i.e. they have no elected sub-national governments) 
and party centralized (i.e. national party leaders nominate candidates to constituency elections for 
the national legislature). 
 
In our formal model, we consider decentralized parties to be those that hold open or closed primaries 
(modeled separately) to choose candidates, as opposed to having national party leaders nominate them.  
While we understand that many decentralized parties in the world have free candidate access to the ballot 
(i.e. by collecting signatures or paying a fee) rather than primaries, we believe these decentralized 
structures will have many of the same effects as primaries (see Carey and Shugart 1995).   
 In our model, we extend the decentralization theorem by incorporating inter-jurisdictional spillovers 
and find that the benefits of decentralization continue to hold (our “strong decentralization theorem”).  
Moreover, the results of our model indicate that the combination of democratic decentralization and party 
centralization yields the most efficient provision of public goods.
4
  The intuition is that democratic 
decentralization produces incentives on the part of politicians to provide citizens with the bundle of public 
goods that they desire.  In other words, as Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972) point out, polities with elected 
sub-national governments can better target public services to the desires of their constituents, allowing 
bundles of goods to vary across constituency.  Of course, having these governments be democratically 
elected is the key to ensuring that they are responsive to citizen desires (see Bird and Vaillancourt 1998, 
Manor 1999). 
 Party centralization, on the other hand, has the benefit of increasing the chances that the 
externalities of local public goods will be internalized.  A common concern about democratic and fiscal 
decentralization is that local governments will under-provide public goods whose benefits spillover beyond 
their constituencies (e.g., Bird et al. 2003).  This is because these governments are unable to internalize and 
                                                          
4
 Note, however, that our results indicate that democratic decentralization, when combined with open primaries, also yields 
positive outcomes.  However, closed primaries are more problematic.  As we are unable to differentiate cross-nationally between 
open and closed primaries in our empirical estimation, we plan to compare centralized and decentralized parties in the aggregate.  
It should also be noted that all of our predictions are based on specific assumptions that we will highlight in our models below.   
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profit from the political benefits of providing these goods optimally.  The rational policy is instead to 
ignore the benefits that arise in other jurisdictions and/or to free-ride on the expenditures of neighboring 
districts; in either case the production of public goods will not be optimal.  A number of basic public 
services, such as primary health, general education, water treatment and environmental protection, are 
likely to generate spillover effects and may not receive sufficient financing from local governments. 
 When parties are centralized, however, sub-national elected leaders do have some incentives to 
provide goods that may spillover into neighboring constituencies.  National party leaders will be interested 
in generating optimal levels of public goods with spillover effects because they are concerned with their 
party’s prospects in the country as a whole.  In centralized parties, these national leaders have significant 
powers, not least of which is nomination power, over sub-national politicians and can push them to supply 
these goods.   
To summarize, then, sub-national leaders in these systems have two masters whose interests are 
sometimes in competition, namely party chiefs in the national capital and local voters in their 
constituencies.  Without the former, these leaders cannot be nominated and without the latter they cannot 
be elected.  These competing loyalties produce incentives both to provide differentiated local public goods 
and to spend more money on goods with spillover effects.  As a result, our argument is that systems that 
mix democratic decentralization with party centralization will have the best outcomes, other things equal.  
Systems that are centralized in both ways lack sufficient incentives to differentiate and target goods to local 
preferences, and systems that are decentralized in both have little incentive to generate optimal levels of 
public goods with geographical externalities. 
A final question is whether countries that mix centralization and decentralization in the reverse way, 
those with no locally elected governments but with decentralized parties, might be able to produce the same 
beneficial tension.  We think not.  Even if politicians elected to the national legislature from local districts 
have incentives to concern themselves with local preferences, their ability to force the central government 
to differentiate tax and spending bundles for their constituents will be limited.  Moreover, theoretical 
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models developed by Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003) indicate that, while central 
governments may provide different constituencies with different bundles of public goods, a more 
decentralized approach to decision-making is likely to produce more efficient differentiation.   
 
The Formal Model 
In this section, we present our full formal expansion of the decentralization theorem.   
The Benchmark 
We begin by characterizing the set of local public goods that maximize the aggregate public good 
surplus which is our criteria for the comparative analysis of the welfare properties of the fiscally centralized 
and decentralized provision of local public goods. This benchmark allows us to compare our results with 
the normative analysis of Oates (1972) and recent political economy analysis (see Besley and Coate 2003 
and Lookwood 2008).  
Consider an economy constituted by districts   and –   with           individuals in each 
district. Households do not have mobility across jurisdictions. The preferences of a household with an 
endowment     in district   is                                  subject to     
        and 
             , where           is the individual´s indirect utility,                are his preferences 
over a private good   ,                is the overall consumption of local public goods provided by 
district  ,   , and by district   ,    , and where    is a head tax on residents of district   
The parameter                 , measures the extent of inter-regional spillovers of     over 
residents of district  . For local public goods without spillovers            , and       when local 
spending in district    is over a nationwide pure public good. Condition (a) is the individual’s budget 
constraint. The distribution of heterogeneous endowments across districts is given by 
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                         with            
       
  . Condition (b),             is the constraint 
that public goods are financed by taxes.
5
  
The nationwide welfare for this economy is given by:  
            
    
            
      
                                           
Let                          such that               . We assume       is a negative 
definite Hessian of    . For                          then    is a global maximizer of     in the 
constrained policy set.  
Proposition 1 characterizes a set of local public goods with and without spillovers that are Pareto 
efficient and exhaust the gains attributed to matching the size of local public spending according to the 
heterogeneous preferences of households over public goods.  
 
Proposition 1. The Pareto efficient local public goods                  that match the heterogeneous 
preferences of households across districts satisfy: 
       
   
   
    
               
    
    
     
       
 
 
         
    
   
   
                    
Proof. 
Find         
                   and re-arrange terms to obtain the result in (2). 
 
 In (2) local public goods with and without spillovers are provided at the point in which the marginal 
social gains in both districts from a marginal change in           (equivalent to the change in utility of 
                                                          
5
  The government´s budget constraints say that    is financed by a head tax applied only to residents of the district. This 
configuration allows us to eliminate any possible gains of economies of scale in the provision of local public goods by the central 
government over sub-national governments. We impose this condition to evaluate whether the Decentralization Theorem of 
Oates (1972) holds in modern democracies once we introduce political institutions and incentives instead of governments 
controlled by benevolent social planners. 
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residents of district          
   
       
     and due to inter-regional spillovers the change in utility of 
residents of district –              
    
         
     ) is equal to the social marginal costs, 
 
 
 
         
    
   
   
     of financing local spending through taxation. At           the aggregate surplus 
from local public goods is maximized. 
 
Party Centralization in a Single Unit of Government  
In this section we develop a two stage model of electoral competition for a democracy with party 
centralization. The parties’ problem is to aggregate the heterogeneous and conflicting preferences of voters 
for public spending into a policy platform that maximizes the parties’ probabilities of winning the election. 
In the first stage, candidates announce policies and party leaders nominate the candidate that will run in the 
general election with the party label. We do not model the decision of citizens to become candidates, we 
simply assume two candidates in each party look for the nomination of their parties. For an economy with 
party centralization, party leaders have full command on policy making by nominating only those 
candidates who adopt the ideal fiscal policy of party leaders. In the second stage of the political process, 
voters observe the parties’ policies and elect a public official in the general election. All individuals vote.  
Two parties, labeled   and   , compete in the election to form the government in a majoritarian 
electoral system with single member districts. The winning candidate takes all, forms the government, and 
designs policy. Under a central government, local public goods are provided by a single government that 
represents voters of all districts. The government finances its budget expenditures through a uniform tax on 
residents of all districts. We follow the literature by assuming that local public goods provided by the 
central government are uniform across districts (see Oates 1972, 1995).  
In the second stage of the electoral process, individuals vote for the party that advances the 
spending policy that is closest to their own views on public spending. Denote   
               
              where    is the difference in the voter’s payoff if party   is elected and implements 
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policies     and      in districts   and    instead of the alternative policies      and       when  party –   
is elected. The voter type    votes for party    if  
    , if  
     he votes for party –  , and the voter 
flips a fair coin if  
    . 
 From the point of view of parties, the individual’s choice of the vote is uncertain. The probability 
that a voter type    votes for party   in district   is   
           
     
   
  
  
  
   
  , where   
     
    is a 
continuous probability distribution over  
  . The expected vote of party   in district   is   
   
       
    
  
     
       and the expected vote in both districts is   
     
  
    . Define   
     
    
  
  
          as a continuous cumulative distribution over the plurality of the party,   
 , where   
  
   
    
  
  
  
   
  and   
    
   is the probability distribution over the party´s plurality.
 
 
The equilibrium provision of local public goods for a democracy with a majoritarian electoral 
system, party centralization, and a nationwide election to form the central government,   
  , is characterized 
in proposition 2. Under our assumptions, Downsian parties converge in their fiscal platforms since they 
maximize a continuous an strictly concave probability of winning the election in the constrained policy set 
based on a common system of beliefs and strategy policy set (for a formal proof of convergence in 
probabilistic models with homogeneous parties see Coughlin 1992). Formally, 
 
Proposition 2 Parties    select   
         for an economy with party centralization and a single unit of 
government such that 
  
             
    
      
               
     
      
                                                            
 
Define    
     
     
    ,    
  and    
    
    
      
    
    
     
    . Moreover, we 
assume    
   is a negative definite Hessian of   
 . For the case   
     
   satisfies       
          
    
  and       
         
     then   
   is a global maximizer of   
  in the constrained policy set.  
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Lemma 1 Local public goods are Pareto efficient for an economy with a majoritarian electoral system, 
single member districts, a single unit of government, a centralized party system, and for              
   . All parties converge in providing a uniform local public good across districts,   
      
       
        
satisfying 
               
   
   
    
   
      
    
 
 
          
    
   
   
     
      
                 
Proof 
See the appendix. 
 
Lemma 1 says    
  is Pareto efficient for all                   since a nationwide election 
provides voting rights to residents of all districts and parties have electoral incentives to aggregate the 
households’ benefits (the left hand side of 4) and the parties’ electoral costs (the right hand side of 4) from 
the provision of the uniform local public good in all districts.  
 
Local Governments and Party Centralization 
In this section we consider an economy with party centralization in which local public goods are 
provided by a system of local governments. Two parties compete in the local election of each district to 
form the local government. In a federation with a centralized party system, the leaders of nationwide parties 
face multiple electoral contests and nominate candidates who propose policies that maximize the party’s 
joint probability of winning the elections in districts   and –  .
6
 As mentioned above, in a centralized party 
system, party leaders have full command on policy making by nominating only those candidates who adopt 
the ideal fiscal policy of party leaders. The winning party in each district takes all, forms the government, 
                                                          
6
 In this paper we only consider the, empirically relevant, case in which parties have presence in all of the jurisdictions and we 
ignore the case in which some parties have only a regional presence. 
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and designs policy. Local public goods in each district are chosen by the government of the district and 
expenditure is financed by a uniform tax on residents of the district.  
 The findings of this section are the following: First, in lemma 2 we show that party centralization in 
a system of local governments leads to Pareto efficient local public goods with and without inter-regional 
spillovers. Moreover, in a system of local governments public spending is differentiated to match the 
heterogeneous preferences of voters across districts. 
We also show that the provision of local public goods by a system of local governments is welfare 
superior to the unitary provision of local public goods with and without spillovers if parties are centralized, 
party leaders seek to maximize votes, the preferences over public goods are heterogeneous, and the unitary 
provision does not show economies of scale. 
To prove our claims, we define the joint probability of party z of winning the elections in districts   
and –   by    
     
     
      
     as a function of the pluralities of the party in both districts,    
   and    
   
, 
where    
      
      
          , and    
          
    
   
      
       is the proportion of votes that party   
expects to receive in the local election of district  , and    
      
    is the marginal probability that a voter 
type    votes for the party in the district´s election. 
 
Proposition 3 In the local election of district   of an economy with party centralization, parties    and    
select    
          such that 
   
               
     
      
                                                              
 
Define     
      
      
    , and assume     
   is a negative definite Hessian of     
 . For    
   
satisfying      
     
            
             
   is a global maximizer of     
  in the constrained policy set.  
On what follows, Lemma 2 characterizes the equilibrium spending policies for this economy and 
Theorem 1 shows the main result of this section. 
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Lemma 2 Party centralization in a system of local governments leads to a set of Pareto efficient local 
public goods    
      
      
     for all                     . At the political equilibrium,    
          
satisfies the following: 
       
   
   
    
                
    
    
     
        
 
 
         
    
   
   
                 
Proof 
See the appendix. 
 
Lemma 2 says that in each jurisdiction, parties in district   choose a policy that is equivalent to a 
policy that maximizes an anonymous Utilitarian nationwide social welfare function subject to the constraint 
that the local public good of the district is financed by the residents of the district (see the equivalence 
between the results in 2 and 6 implying    
          ) . As a result, the spending policies in a system of 
local governments are Pareto efficient for local public goods with and without spillovers. Even though a 
local election in district   does not provide voting rights to voters of other jurisdictions, local public goods 
are Pareto efficient because the political process is centralized and rational parties recognize that the inter-
regional externalities of local public goods create an interdependence between the parties’ share of vote in 
the local elections of districts   and –  . Thus, parties have electoral incentives to propose spending policies 
that internalize the inter-regional spillovers to maximize the party’s joint probability of winning local 
elections in districts   and –  . 
 
Theorem 1 “Strong Decentralization Theorem”: The provision of local public goods with and without 
inter-regional spillovers by a system of local governments welfare-dominates the centralized provision. 
Proof 
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See the appendix. 
 
Theorem 1 says that the nationwide welfare of voters is higher under the provision of local public 
goods with and without inter-regional spillovers by a system of local governments relative the nationwide 
wellbeing derived by the provision of local public goods provided by the central government.  This is a 
stronger case for the decentralized provision of local public goods than the Decentralization Theorem in 
which a system of local governments is welfare superior to a unitary provision only for the case in which 
local public goods do not display inter-regional spillovers (see Oates 1972). 
Note, first that, local public goods with and without inter-regional spillovers are Pareto efficient 
under the provision of both a central government and a system of local governments. Second, local 
elections induce parties to select the size of public spending that maximizes a unanimous utilitarian 
nationwide social welfare without the constraint that local public goods must be uniform as it is the case of 
the unitary provision in our economy. By matching the heterogeneous preferences of households for public 
spending across districts, Pareto efficient local public goods with and without regional spillovers in a 
federation exhausts the nationwide welfare benefits to be gained from policy differentiation. Since the 
central government does not differentiate local public goods to local preferences then a system of local 
governments is welfare superior to the unitary option of public spending.  
 
Fiscal Federalism and Party Decentralization 
In this section we extend our analysis of the provision of local public goods for a democracy with a 
majoritarian electoral system, single member districts, and decentralized party systems. For a democracy 
with party decentralization, a primary election takes place in which residents vote to nominate a candidate 
while in the general election voters elect a public official. In this setting, our interest is to analyze how the 
political institutions of primaries create incentives for parties to represent the interests of a broad set of 
voters in the electorate versus the preferences of a minority coalition of voters in the provision of local 
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public goods. In the latter case, the government seeks to target the benefits of the collective action in this 
economy. 
Proponents of decentralized party systems argue that primary elections promote the political 
participation of voters and the representation of their interests in the policies implemented by the 
government. However, the participation rules of primaries might actually limit both the voters’ 
participation in elections and their political influence on policy design.  
Primary elections can be open, semi-closed, and closed (see Kaufman and Gimpel 2003). In open 
primaries voters of any affiliation may vote for any party while in closed primaries only those voters 
affiliated with a party (probably partisan voters) can vote in the party’s primary. In closed primaries 
candidates have electoral incentives to weigh (discount) heavily the preferences over policy of those voters 
who can (not) participate in the primary election. Hence, parties might have electoral incentives to 
implement the ideal provision of local public goods of primary voters. This might be considered socially 
undesirable because in this case public spending does not maximize the fiscal exchange associated with the 
provision of local public goods for all residents of this economy but it maximizes the fiscal surplus from 
public goods for a minority coalition of voters in the electorate (the primary voters).
7
  
The main results of this section are: first, we show that local public goods without inter-regional 
spillovers are Pareto efficient in decentralized political regimes for all types of primary elections and all 
structures of government. In our economy, the participation rules of primaries do not affect the efficiency 
but affect the distribution of gains across voters from public spending by modifying the political influence 
of primary versus general election voters in determining the level of public spending. 
                                                          
7
 The fiscal exchange of local public goods reflects the following tradeoff: on the one hand, an increase of public spending leads 
to higher utility of voters (this is the marginal benefit). On the other hand, higher spending requires higher taxes and lower 
consumption of private goods (this is the marginal cost). At low taxes, public spending is also low which implies that the 
marginal benefit is likely to outweigh the marginal costs of increasing the provision of local public goods. This guarantees that at 
the equilibrium, the fiscal exchange associated with the provision of local public goods entails a non-negative surplus. See, for 
example, Martinez-Vazquez (1982).  
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Second, we also show that the Decentralization Theorem holds for economies with majoritarian 
electoral systems, single member districts, and decentralized party regimes with open primaries. However, 
if the primaries are closed the decentralization Theorem, in general, does not hold.  
 
Primary and General Elections in a Single Government and a System of Local Governments 
Consider first the case in which parties compete for a single national government in a sequential 
electoral contest. In the first stage of our model, two individuals, denoted by   and    in each party seek the 
nomination of their party by declaring their binding policy platforms over public spending, and all voters 
observe the candidates’ policies but only qualified voters vote in the primary election.8 In a closed primary 
the right to vote is limited only to voters affiliated with the party, and in open primaries all voters (those 
affiliated and not affiliated with some party) can vote to nominate a candidate.
 9  
The candidate who 
receives the majority of the votes across all districts wins the nomination of his party.  
In the second stage, the general election takes place and all voters in the electorate vote from the set 
of nominated candidates to elect a public official. Voting is sincere at the different stages of the electoral 
contest.
10
 The winner of the general election takes all, forms the government, and implements his policy 
platform.  
In the first stage of the game, candidates        announce their fiscal platforms on public spending 
to maximize the joint probability,   
  
, of winning the nationwide primary and general elections. 
Candidates propose a policy platform that is sequentially rational and therefore their policy platform must 
consider two different states that might be played in the second stage: the candidates might compete in the 
general election against candidate 1 or 2 of party   . 
                                                          
8
 The assumption that, in the first stage of the electoral contest, candidates announce a binding policy platform is for simplicity of 
the analysis and it ignores dynamic inconsistency issues such as the possibility that candidates might announce different policies 
in the primary and general election to please, respectively, primary and general election voters. 
9
 This assumption implies that if the primary is open then all voters in the economy vote in the primaries of parties   and –  , 
while if the primary is closed then only qualified voters vote in the primary of party   or party –  . 
10
 The assumption that voters vote sincerely also seeks to simplify the analysis and it ignores strategic voting behavior such as 
credible threats of some coalition of voters who might abstain from voting for the nominated candidate in the general election if 
the candidate changes the policy position he previously announced in the primary election. 
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,   as the joint cumulative mass 
that     wins both elections where   
      
      
     
     
     ,    
  
 is the nationwide plurality of 
candidate     versus that of candidate             in the primary election, and   
  
 
is the nationwide 
plurality  for the state in which candidate     runs against candidate z1  in the general election. A 
similar interpretation is given to   
  
.
11
  
For each of the pluralities     
      
      
           
     
     
              it is satisfied 
that    
      
      and   
     
        , where    
       
   
   is the nationwide expected 
proportion of the vote in the primary and   
      
   
   is the nationwide expected proportion of the vote 
of candidate     for        . The expected proportion of the vote of candidate   in the primary of 
district   is    
             
     
   
       
         where    
       
               
      
      
       
       
   
 
is the continuous marginal probability that a voter type    in district i votes for     in the primary, and 
             
      
      
    
 
is the joint probability that the voter type    votes for     in the primary 
and the general election. Similarly, the corresponding proportion of the vote for     in district   in the 
general election is   
           
    
  
      
       
 
for          where   
   
 is the marginal cumulative 
mass of     in district   if he faces candidates              in the general election. 
The joint probability         
      
      
     is continuous and non-decreasing with    
      
   
, and 
  
   
. Sincere voting implies that a voter type    in district i votes for      in the nationwide primary and 
general election if     
                                      ,  
  
                                   ,  
                                   . 
 
                                                          
11
 On what follows, and for convenience of our analysis, we will distinguish voters who participate in the primary election (from 
voters who participate in the general election) with a tilde. 
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Proposition 4 A candidate    of party   selects   
   
 for an economy with a single unit of government and 
party decentralization such that 
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Moreover, assume    
    is a negative definite Hessian of   
  
. For   
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     , then   
   
 is a global maximizer of   
      
      
     
    in the 
constrained policy set. 
 
Proposition 5 The electoral equilibrium for our economy with party decentralization for all structures of 
government is: all candidates of the same party select the same fiscal platform. However, if the primary 
election is open the fiscal policies of parties z and –z converge and if the primary is closed the parties´ 
policies diverge. 
  
Lemma 3 For economies with a decentralized party system and a central government representing voters 
of all districts, a uniform and Pareto efficient local public good          
        is provided such that 
it satisfies the following: 
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                 . Moreover,            
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  is a weighted rate of substitution between marginal changes in the parties´ plurality in the primary and 
the general election, and 
  
    
   
 
   
 
       
  
   
   
  
   
  
 
   
  
   
  
    
  
   
 
   
   
     
    
   
  
   
  
   
           
                
Where   
  is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability of voting for party z in the 
nationwide general election,     
     
   , and the change in the wellbeing of voters from an increase in the 
provision of the local public good    
     
  .  
Proof 
See the appendix. 
 
  In this economy, the parties’ policies converge when the primary is open and diverge in sequential 
elections with closed primaries. The intuition of this result is straightforward: in sequential elections with 
open primaries parties share a common system of beliefs over the citizens’ voting behavior, there are no 
restrictions on the voting rights for citizens (voters can vote in all primaries and the general election), the 
policy strategy set is the same for both parties, and candidates are not otherwise differentiated. Moreover, 
parties seek to maximize a function that is continuous and strictly concave in the constrained policy space. 
In this case, parties converge in their fiscal policies by selecting the ideal policy of the average voter of the 
general election. 
 However, if primaries are closed then parties propose a uniform policy that reflects a compromise 
between the ideal policy of a weighted average voter of the primary and the ideal policy of a weighted 
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average voter of the general election (see expression 8). In closed primaries, the voting rights are only 
granted to affiliated voters and therefore the distribution of the ideal policies of primary voters is different 
for each party. Since the distribution of ideal policies of primary and general election voters that parties 
aggregate are different, the parties’ spending policies diverge.  
 Lemma 3 characterizes the first order condition for the problem of public spending design for 
candidates in decentralized party systems. In this Lemma, the left hand side of (8) is a weighted average of 
marginal indirect utility gains due to a marginal change in the public good for all voters participating in the 
general election while the first term of the right hand side of (8) is the corresponding weighted marginal 
indirect utility gain of primary voters. The expression     is a weighted rate of substitution between 
marginal changes in the parties’ plurality in the primary and the general election. This term reflects the 
parties’ incentives to weigh more (less) heavily the preferences over public spending of primary versus 
general election voters. The higher     the higher is the marginal plurality gain of the party in the primary 
associated with a small increase in   
    and the higher the electoral incentives for party   to produce a 
policy closer to the ideal policy of the weighted average primary voter. 
 Moreover,   
  is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability of voting for party   for 
the individual type   ,    
     
   , and the change in the well being of the voter from an increase in the 
provision of the local public good    
     
  . Candidates will have electoral incentives to increase the size 
of the uniform local public good when voters with higher than average marginal probabilities of voting for 
the candidate have also higher than average values of     
     
  .  
 
 
 
Party Decentralization and Local Elections 
Now we proceed to characterize the provision of local public goods in a system of local 
governments with party decentralization. A detailed description of the electoral game for an economy with 
26 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
party decentralization in a system of local governments is omitted to save space. However, the structure of 
the game is easily extended from our previous discussion: a local primary and general election take place. 
Candidates      in each party, and in each district, announce policy platforms that maximize the joint 
probability of the candidate, say      of winning the primary and general elections in their district, 
    
       
      
     
   . Only qualified residents of the district vote in the local primary while all the residents 
of the district can vote in the local general election. Voting is sincere in both elections. The local general 
election takes place, the winner takes all, and implements his policy platform. 
 
Proposition 6 In the local election of district   of an economy with party decentralization, all candidates 
      of party   select    
         such that 
   
               
       
      
     
                                                    
 
We assume      
    is a negative definite Hessian of     
  . If    
       satisfies     
      
     
       
         then    
    is a global maximizer of     
   in the constrained policy set.  
On what follows, Lemma 4 provides a general characterization of local public goods for federations 
with majoritarian systems, single member districts, and party decentralized regimes. Also on what follows, 
Theorems 2 and 3 show that the decentralization theorem holds in open primaries and fails to hold in closed 
primaries. 
 
Lemma 4 For economies with party decentralization and a system of local governments representing 
voters in each district, local public goods    
            are provided such that    
   
 satisfies the following: 
       
    
    
      
                        
     
    
  
    
  
    
      
              
                  
Where 
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is a weighted rate of substitution between marginal changes in the party’s plurality in the district’s primary 
and the general local election, and 
  
    
    
  
   
  
       
   
   
   
  
   
  
  
   
  
    
  
  
    
  
   
  
       
    
   
  
   
  
   
       
               
is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability that voter type    votes for party z in the local 
general election in district i,     
     
   , and the change in the well being of voters from an increase in the 
provision of the local public good     
      
   . 
Proof 
See the appendix. 
   
 The interpretation to this equilibrium is similar to that given in Lemma 3. In local elections, parties 
provide a public good that reflects a compromise between the ideal spending policies of the district’s 
weighted average voter of the primary and the district´s weighted average voter of the general election. The 
parties´ incentives to weigh more (less) heavily the preferences over public spending of primary versus 
general election voters in district   are given by     and   
  . The higher    , the higher the electoral 
incentives for party   to produce a policy closer to the ideal policy of the weighted average primary voter in 
district  . Moreover, the expression,   
  , is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability of 
voting for party   in the general election of the district,    
     
   , and the change in well being of voters 
from an increase in the provision of the local public good,    
      
   .  For   
    , the higher   
   the 
higher the provision of the public good in the district. 
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Theorem 2 The Decentralization Theorem holds in Majoritarian democracies with a decentralized party 
system, open primaries, and single member districts. 
Proof 
See the appendix 
  
 Theorem 2 shows that candidates running for local governments in a party decentralized system 
with open primaries have incentives to propose the size of public spending that maximizes a unanimous 
Utilitarian social welfare function of local residents in each jurisdiction. The resulting policies are Pareto 
efficient for local public goods without spillovers. Moreover, public goods are matched according to the 
heterogeneous preferences of voters across districts. In the case candidates compete to form a nationwide 
government, local public goods with and without spillover are uniform and Pareto efficient, and the size of 
the local public good reflects the ideal size on public spending from the nationwide average voter. Lastly, if 
local public goods do not display regional spillovers then a system of local governments supplying local 
public goods    
     in districts   and    is welfare superior to a uniform provision   
     by a central 
government. Consequently, the Decentralization Theorem holds for majoritarian democracies with 
decentralized party regimes and open primaries. 
 
Theorem 3 The Decentralization Theorem does not hold in Majoritarian democracies with single member 
districts and decentralized party systems with closed primaries. 
Proof 
See the appendix 
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 In general, the Decentralization Theorem does not hold for a democracy with party decentralization 
and closed primaries.
12
 To see this, consider the case in which minority coalitions (i.e. primary voters) have 
strong political influence over local governments that is translated into local public goods that are closer to 
their preferences. In this case, the electoral competition might produce extreme policy positions (too much 
or too little local public spending) instead of moderate policies. 
 For instance, in condition (13) there are parametric values of     and   
    in which local elections 
produce the size of public spending in the vicinity of the ideal policy of primary voters in each district (a 
minority of the society) instead of the ideal policy of all residents in each district (the utilitarian measure of 
social welfare). Simultaneously, we can find parametric values in the equilibrium of the election to form a 
central government that averages the political influence of local coalitions to produce a more moderate 
provision of local public goods that could be welfare superior to the less moderate provision of public 
goods in the system of local governments. This is likely true for an economy with many localities in which 
the political influence of local coalitions is significant over local governments but the influence of local 
minority groups fades away in the nationwide election. Therefore, in this setting, the provision of a uniform 
public good by a single government could be welfare superior to the set of differentiated but extreme 
provision of local public goods in a system of local governments.
13
  
 
Empirical Analysis 
 The key expectation stemming from our formal model is that the combination of democratic 
decentralization and party centralization will lead to the best delivery of public goods, other things equal.  
We test this hypothesis with a series of quantitative models of all electorally competitive countries from 
1976 to 2007, contingent on data availability.  Our most expansive model considers 2078 observations and 
                                                          
12
 A comparison of (8) and (2) shows that the electorally optimal policy for Downsian candidates in a nationwide sequential 
election with closed primaries are, in general, different to the size of public spending that maximizes the fiscal surplus from 
public spending for all residents in the economy. A similar conclusion is reached for local elections in a federation (see 
conditions 13 and 2). As a result, the Decentralization Theorem does not hold. 
13
 It is also simple to characterize conditions in which a system of local governments would produce public goods that are Pareto 
superior to those provided by a single nationwide government. 
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133 countries, to our knowledge the broadest examination of sub-national political institutions in the 
literature.  
 We employ seven different measures of educational outcomes to operationalize our dependent 
variable, the provision of public goods at the sub-national level.  Educational outcome measures are often 
used in the empirical literature to denote public goods provision at the sub-national level (see, for example, 
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 2007 and Faguet and Sanchez 2008).  Our specific measures come from 
World Bank (2010) and include Primary School Completion Rate, Primary School Teachers as a 
proportion of youth population, Children out of School as a proportion of youth population, Preprimary 
Enrollment Rate, Primary Enrollment Rate, Secondary Enrollment Rate, and Tertiary Enrollment Rate. We 
discuss how these seven measures are coded and provide some summary statistics in Table 1.  
 We select educational outcomes as our dependent variable because they allow us to examine both 
allocative efficiency gains (i.e. differentiation based on local preference – the main hypothesized benefit of 
democratic decentralization) and the degree to which public goods are provided in the face of spillovers 
(the hypothesized benefit of centralized parties).  Why should this be so?  First, our indicators of 
educational provision are subject to strong extra-jurisdictional spillover effects.  All inhabitants of a 
country benefit from the educational attainment of their fellow citizens — in general, greater knowledge 
accumulation leads to reduced crime and economic improvements that spill outside the limits of any single 
jurisdiction. Another source of spillover effects occurs with population mobility – local residents may move 
outside a jurisdiction after receiving their education, and residents of neighboring jurisdictions may 
sometimes register for schools (especially tertiary schools) not provided in their own locales. For these 
reasons, the provision of education, as measured by our indicators, can be associated with a greater 
willingness on the part of local leaders to provide public goods in the presence of spillovers. 
 Our educational indicators also capture allocative efficiency effects for at least two reasons.  First, 
improved political accountability resulting from democratic decentralization provides decentralized 
governments greater incentives to act in accordance with the needs and preferences of their constituents.  
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics – The Dependent Variable (Differenced and Lagged) 
Variable Computation Method and Source Mean Range Expectations 
Primary School 
Completion Rate 
(Differenced) 
The differenced ratio of total primary school graduates to 
the total population of the relevant age. (Source: World 
Bank) 
.873 
-34.19 to 
46.19 
Dependent 
Variable 
Children Out of School 
(Differenced) 
The differenced ratio of primary aged children not 
enrolled in school to the total population under age 14. 
(Source: World Bank) 
-.220 
-9.44 to 
4.88 
Dependent 
Variable 
Primary School Teachers 
(Differenced) 
The differenced ratio of primary school teachers to the 
total population under age 14. (Source: World Bank) 
.027 
-.776 to 
.614 
Dependent 
Variable 
Preprimary School 
Enrollment (Differenced) 
The differenced ratio of total enrollment in preprimary 
school, regardless of age, to the total population of 
preprimary school age. (Source: World Bank) 
1.27 
-45.5 to 
46.2 
Dependent 
Variable 
Primary School Enrollment 
(Differenced) 
The differenced ratio of total enrollment in primary 
school, regardless of age, to the total population of 
primary school age. (Source: World Bank) 
.618 
-27.0 to 
28.7 
Dependent 
Variable 
Secondary School 
Enrollment (Differenced) 
The differenced ratio of total enrollment in secondary 
school, regardless of age, to the total population of 
secondary school age. (Source: World Bank) 
1.01 
-51.8 to 
38.2 
Dependent 
Variable 
Tertiary School Enrollment 
(Differenced) 
The differenced ratio of total enrollment in tertiary 
school, regardless of age, to the total population of 
tertiary school age. (Source: World Bank) 
1.21 
-11.8 to 
26.2 
Dependent 
Variable 
Primary School 
Completion Rate (Lagged) 
The lagged ratio of total primary school graduates to the 
total population of relevant age. (Source: World Bank) 
80.7 
0 to 
125 
Negative 
Children Out of School 
(Lagged) 
The lagged ratio of primary aged children not enrolled in 
school to the total population under age 14. (Source: 
World Bank) 
4.57 0 to 30.1 Negative 
Primary School Teachers 
(Lagged) 
The lagged ratio of primary school teachers to the total 
population under age 14. (Source: World Bank) 
1.57 
.110 to 
4.34 
Negative 
Preprimary School 
Enrollment (Lagged) 
The lagged ratio of total enrollment in preprimary school, 
regardless of age to the total population of preprimary 
school age. (Source: World Bank) 
48.5 
.129 to 
122 
Negative 
Primary School Enrollment 
(Lagged) 
The lagged ratio of total enrollment in primary school, 
regardless of age, to the total population of primary 
school age. (Source: World Bank) 
98.7 
16.8 to 
159 
Negative 
Secondary School 
Enrollment (Lagged) 
The lagged ratio of total enrollment in secondary school, 
regardless of age, to the total population of secondary 
school age. (Source: World Bank) 
70.1 
2.40 to 
162 
Negative 
Tertiary School Enrollment 
(Lagged) 
The lagged ratio of total enrollment in tertiary school, 
regardless of age, to the total population of tertiary school 
age. (Source: World Bank) 
26.8 
.108 to 
98.0 
Negative 
 
 
While most constituencies will prize superior educational outcomes, different sorts of practices are likely to 
produce these outcomes in different locales.  For example, in one constituency, limited resources might 
best be channeled into increasing the number of teachers, whereas in another improved educational 
materials might be a focus.  As a result, we believe that superior educational provision likely reflects (other 
things equal) an ability on the part of officials to consider local preferences and conditions.   
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Second, two recent papers (Faguet and Sanchez 2005 and Solé-Ollé and Esteller-Moré 2005) 
conclude that decentralization leads to better adjustment between investment patterns and local demands (in 
Bolivian municipalities in the first instance and Spanish provinces in the second).  Similarly, in a more 
recent paper, Arze del Granado, Martinez-Vazquez, and McNab (2012) analyze the effects of 
decentralization on the composition of public expenditures for a large panel of countries and conclude that 
decentralization of public goods delivery is usually accompanied by an increase in educational 
expenditures.  This finding asserts that decentralization, via greater responsiveness of public officials and 
preference matching, can increase allocative efficiency by altering the composition of public expenditures.   
On the right side of the equation, our theory requires that we consider both the existence of elected 
sub-national governments and the level of party decentralization at the sub-national level.   We develop an 
original dataset of sub-national political institutions to capture both of these measures, which we code for 
all countries between 1975 and 2010, where data are available.  As part of this dataset, we code for the 
presence of elections, the structure of legislative-executive relations, the electoral system, the extent to 
which the national party system is replicated, and the centralization of parties at both the highest sub-
national level and the municipal level (defined as the lowest level of sub-national government).
14
   
 To operationalize party centralization, we make use of an indicator first developed by Carey and 
Shugart (1995) and labeled the “Ballot” variable.  This variable measures what is perhaps the most 
significant power that national party leaders can wield – the power to nominate candidates for office.  The 
ballot variable is coded “0” when national party leaders have full nomination powers, “1” when they 
nominate a list but voters have the power to change its order (as in open list or alternate vote systems), and 
“2” when they have little power over nomination (as in primary systems or systems where candidates get 
on the ballot by collecting signatures or paying a fee).  Carey and Shugart coded their variable for a small 
number of representative cases, and Hankla (2006) later added all democracies from 1975 to 2004.  We 
                                                          
The dataset, along with a source list, is available upon request.  Note that another comprehensive dataset of sub-national 
indicators has recently been produced by Ivanyna and Shah (2012), but their focus is not on the specific political institutions that 
we code. 
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expand these datasets by capturing not just the power of national party leaders to nominate candidates for 
the national legislature, but also whether these national party leaders can nominate candidates to regional 
and local assemblies.   
 Yet, simply coding party centralization is not enough to measure the power of national party leaders 
over sub-national and municipal elections.  We also need to know whether national parties are competing 
and winning in these elections.  If only 10% of a municipal council’s seats are held by national parties, or 
if, for example, 50% of its seats are chosen in non-partisan elections, national party influence cannot be 
significant even if parties are centralized as defined above. 
 Drawing on these considerations, we create one key independent variable from our dataset to 
include in the model—a dummy variable, labeled Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization, 
coded “1” when (1) there are municipal elections, and (2) more than 75% of municipal council seats are 
held by national parties, and (3) national party leaders exercise centralized power over municipal party 
nomination (i.e. party centralization is coded “0” above).15  To our knowledge, this article is the first to 
consider party system nationalization and party centralization simultaneously in a large empirical model. 
 Additionally, we control for potentially confounding political factors by including two additional 
variables, also coded as part of our original dataset. The first of these is Municipal Plurality, coded “1” 
when municipal council elections are held using a plurality (as opposed to a proportional or mixed) 
electoral system.  The second is Municipal Directly Elected Executive, coded “1” when municipal 
executives are directly elected and not removable (except through impeachment or election recall) by the 
municipal councils.  While there is little research on the impact of these institutions at the municipal level, 
previous research on electoral and executive institutions at the national level indicates that they may matter 
                                                          
15
 Note that the extent of local party system nationalization can vary by municipality within individual countries, and that party 
centralization can vary by party within individual countries.  There tends, all the same, to be a great deal of commonality in party 
system nationalization and party structure within a country, allowing for relatively straightforward coding in most cases.  That 
said, when we encountered mixed cases, we went with what appeared to be the most common institutional structure in the 
country.  Those country-years coded “1” on the primary dummy variable are listed in Table 3, and we are very open to feedback 
by country experts on the accuracy of the coding. 
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for public goods outcomes.
16
  For example, there is reason to believe that strong unitary executives (elected 
and subject to reasonable legislative oversight) may produce better public outcomes than dominant 
legislatures (see, for example, Mukherjee 2003; Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart 2010; Sabatini 2003).  
And, although this finding is still quite contested, proportional electoral systems may have certain benefits 
over simple plurality systems (see, for example, Lijphart 1977).  For all three political variables, of course, 
democratically centralized systems are among those coded “0”.   
We include in the model a series of economic and social control variables, namely GDP per capita 
in purchasing power parity, fertility rate, population density, urban population, world region dummies, and 
expenditure and revenue decentralization.  Countries with a higher GDP per capita can be expected to have 
more resources to pour into education.  Likewise, countries with lower fertility rates will tend to have more 
resources to devote to each child.  Higher levels of population density and urban population should also be 
associated with better educational outcomes, as they facilitate access to teachers and school resources.  And 
greater fiscal decentralization, both on the expenditure and revenue sides, should empower local 
governments to take a greater role in education service delivery.   
 In addition to these variables, we include dummies for world regions in all of the models to control 
for cultural or geographically specific effects.  And as our theoretical model assumes elections, we also 
restrict our models to countries that are minimally electorally competitive using the Legislative Index of 
Electoral Competitiveness from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001).  This index ranges 
from one to seven, and we only include country-years coded at least a six, indicating that more than one 
party holds seats in the national legislature.  We choose this more expansive definition of electoral 
competition in preference to a measure of democracy (such as Polity) in order to maximize our 
observations and because we believe that electoral competition but not necessary full-fledged democracy 
must be present to observe our theorized effects. 
 
                                                          
16
 For a summary of this literature as it relates to local political institutions, see Hankla and Downs (2010). 
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Table 2:  Summary Statistics – The Independent Variables 
Variable Computation Method and Source Mean Range 
Expected Impact on 
Public Goods 
Democratic 
Decentralization, Party 
Centralization (Lagged) 
Coded “1” when (1) there are municipal elections, 
and (2) more than 75% of municipal council seats 
are held by national parties, and (3) national party 
leaders control party nomination in municipal 
elections.  (Source: Original Dataset) 
.505 Dummy 
Positive 
(negatively related to 
Children Out of 
School, positively 
related to all other Y) 
Municipal Plurality 
Coded “1” when (1) there are municipal elections, 
and (2) a plurality system is used to elect the 
municipal assembly. (Source: Original Dataset) 
.262 Dummy 
Uncertain 
(Negative?) 
Municipal Directly Elected 
Executive 
Coded “1” when (1) there are municipal elections, 
and (2) the municipal mayor or other executive is 
directly elected and cannot be removed by the 
municipal council. (Source: Original Dataset) 
.391 Dummy 
 
Uncertain 
(Positive?) 
 
Fertility (Differenced) 
Differenced average births per woman 
(Source: World Bank) 
-.053 
-.340 to 
.335 
Negative 
Fertility (Lagged) 
Lagged average births per woman 
(Source: World Bank) 
3.24 
1.08 to 
7.74 
Negative 
Logged GDP per capita 
(Differenced) 
Differenced Logged GDP per capita ppp 
(Source: World Bank) 
.021 
-.703 to 
.599 
Positive 
Logged GDP per capita 
(Lagged) 
Lagged Logged GDP per capita ppp 
(Source: World Bank) 
8.54 
5.61 to 
10.8 
Positive 
Logged Population Density 
(Differenced) 
Differenced logged people per square kilometer 
(Source: World Bank) 
.014 
-.038 to 
.124 
Positive 
Logged Population Density 
(Lagged) 
Lagged logged people per square kilometer 
(Source: World Bank) 
4.01 
.367 to 
8.76 
Positive 
Urban Population 
(Differenced) 
Differenced urban population as a percent of total 
(Source: World Bank) 
.340 
-.480 to 
3.04 
Positive 
Urban Population (Lagged) 
Lagged urban population as a percent of total 
(Source: World Bank) 
53.5 
7.02 to 
100 
Positive 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
(Differenced) 
Differenced Percentage of Government 
Expenditures Undertaken at the Sub-National 
Level (Source: IMF) 
.0008 
-.210 to 
.196 
Uncertain 
(Positive?) 
Expenditure 
Decentralization (Lagged) 
Lagged Percentage of Government Expenditures 
Undertaken at the Sub-National Level (Source: 
IMF) 
.251 
.016 to 
.605 
Uncertain 
(Positive?) 
Revenue Decentralization 
(Differenced) 
Differenced Percentage of Government Revenues 
Collected at the Sub-National Level (Source: IMF) 
.0009 
-.224 to 
.208 
Uncertain 
(Positive?) 
Revenue Decentralization 
(Lagged) 
Lagged Percentage of Government Revenues 
Collected  at the Sub-National Level (Source: 
IMF) 
.255 
.008 to 
.617 
Uncertain 
(Positive?) 
Regional Dummies 
Dummy variables for seven world regions, with 
Sub-Saharan Africa as the reference category 
N/A N/A N/A 
Legislative Electoral 
Competitiveness (Lagged) 
Lagged Legislative Index of Electoral 
Competitiveness (Source: Database of Political 
Institutions) 
N/A 1 to 7 
Used to restrict 
dataset to countries 
with multiple parties 
in the national 
legislature (scoring 6 
or 7) 
 
 
Table 3: Countries Coded “1” on Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization 
(Note: Only electorally competitive country-years included; coded “1” for 1975-2006 unless otherwise stated) 
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Albania (1992-2006), Argentina (1975, 1984-1990), Austria, Azerbaijan (2000-2006), Benin (2002-2006), Bolivia 
(1987-2006), Bosnia (2003-2006), Botswana, Bulgaria (1991-2006), Burkina Faso (1995-2006), Burundi (2005-
2006), Cambodia (2002-2006), Colombia (1975-1990), Costa Rica, Croatia (1993-2006), Cyprus, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador (1980-96), Egypt (1996-2006), El Salvador (1983-2006), Equatorial Guinea (1995-
2006), Estonia (1993-2006), Fiji (1975-1997), Finland, France, Gabon (1997-2006), Gambia (1975-1994, 2002-
2006), Georgia (1993-2006), Greece, Guatemala (1995-2006), Guinea (2005-2006), Guyana (1994-2006), Haiti 
(1991, 1995-2006), Honduras (1992-2006), Indonesia (2005-2006), Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast (2001-2006), Jamaica, 
Japan, Kazakhstan (1997-2006), South Korea (1991-2006), Kirgizia (1996-1998), Latvia (1994-2006), Lebanon 
(1998-2006), Liberia (1986-1989), Lithuania (1995-2006), Macedonia (1996-2006), Madagascar (1995-2006), 
Malawi (2000-2005), Mali (1993-2006), Mauritania (1992-2005), Mexico, Moldova (1995-2006), Moldova (1995-
2006), Mongolia (2001-2006), Morocco (1992-2006), Mozambique (1998-2006), Namibia (1992-2006), Nepal 
(1992-2001), Nicaragua (1990-2006), Niger (2004-2006), Panama (1985-2006), Paraguay (1991-2006), Peru 
(1981-2006), Portugal (1977-2006), Romania (1992-2006), Russia (2000-2006), Senegal (1996-2006), Sierra Leone 
(2004-2006), Slovak Republic (1993-2006), Slovenia (1994-2006), Spain (1979-2006), Sri Lanka (1975-1986), 
Sweden, Taiwan (1994-2006), Tajikistan (2000-2006), Tanzania (1996-2006), Thailand (1976, 1980-2006), 
Trinidad, Tunisia (1995-2006), Ukraine (1998-2006), United Kingdom, Uzbekistan (2000-2006), Venezuela, Yemen 
(2001-2006), Yugoslavia (1993-2001), Zambia (1992-2006), Zimbabwe (1984-2006)  
 
We do not control for factors, such as teacher pay, that are related directly to educational outcomes, 
as these are potentially part of the causal mechanism connecting political institutions with educational 
outcomes.  The data for GDP per capita, fertility rate, urban population, and population density are from 
World Bank (2010), and the fiscal decentralization indicators are from International Monetary Fund (2004).  
Summary statistics on all of our variables are presented in Table 2, and a complete listing of all country-
years coded “1” on our primary Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization variable is presented in 
Table 3. 
 For our empirical analyses, we estimate error correction models with random effects and regional 
dummies.
17
  Granger causality tests show that no endogeneity exists in the models, so an instrumental 
variable approach is not necessary in this context.  However, Dickey-Fuller tests show that our dependent 
variables are non-stationary in many of our country cases.  It is this fact that motivates the use of error 
correction models for our analysis, as the differenced dependent variable corrects for the unit root problem.  
In addition, an error correction framework has the benefit of allowing us to separate the short-term from the 
long-term effects of our independent variables.  Each independent variable is included in the model in both 
differenced and lagged form, with the differenced variables measuring short-term effects and the lagged 
                                                          
17
 For more on error correction models, see Baltagi 2000. 
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variables measuring long-term effects.  We do not difference our primary independent variables as they 
change only slowly across time, and so differencing would produce a large number of zeros.   
 For our primary models, we select a random effects framework.  While a Hausman test shows that 
we cannot reject fixed country effects in our models, the low level of cross-temporal variable in our 
primary independent variables means that a fixed effects model will wash out our most interesting 
variation.  By contrast, our random effects models allow us to deal with panel effects in a way that does not 
eliminate cross-country variation.  For robustness, we also run our primary models with a pooled OLS 
estimator and country-clustered standard errors, as OLS coefficients have been shown to be quite robust in 
a variety of settings (see Beck and Katz 1995).  For reasons of space we do not present these results, but we 
discuss them in the next section. 
 As a robustness test, we re-estimate each of our seven models after restricting the dependent 
variables to within two standard deviations in each direction from their means.  We do this to ensure that 
our results are not dependent on the somewhat large outliers to be found in the differenced dependent 
variables.  We make use of robust standard errors in each of our models, and we include a lagged 
dependent variable, as is customary in error correction models.  We present the results of our seven primary 
models in Table 4, of those same models without outliers in Table 5, and of the models with fiscal 
decentralization controls in Table 6.   
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Table 4:  Results of the Primary Models 
(Error Correction Models with Random Effects, Robust Standard Errors, and Regional Dummies) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 Y= Diff. 
Primary 
Completion 
Rate 
(N=1290, 
120 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Primary 
School 
Teachers 
(N=1523, 
130 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Preprimary 
Enrollment 
Rate 
(N=1795, 
125 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Primary 
Enrollment 
Rate 
(N=2078, 
133 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Secondary 
Enrollment 
Rate 
(N=1808, 
130 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Tertiary 
Enrollment 
Rate 
(N=1612, 
127 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Children 
Out of 
School 
(N=1293, 
117 
countries) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable 
-0.078*** 
(0.019) 
-.006 
(.007) 
-.024*** 
(.007) 
-.065 
(.014) 
-.035 
(.008) 
.001 
(.006) 
-0.083*** 
(0.022) 
Democratic 
Decentralization, 
Party Centralization 
(Lagged) 
0.452** 
(0.225) 
.008* 
(.005) 
.376* 
(.226) 
.427 
(.364) 
.358** 
(.152) 
.102 
(.151) 
-0.177 
(0.163) 
Municipal Plurality 
(Lagged) 
-0.028 
(0.313) 
-.004 
(.005) 
-.019 
(.295) 
-.161 
(.470) 
-.319* 
(.172) 
.051 
(.216) 
0.150 
(0.100) 
Municipal Directly 
Elected Executive 
(Lagged) 
-0.086 
(0.240) 
.009 
(.006) 
.100 
(.222) 
.289 
(.374) 
-.146 
(.169) 
.421*** 
(.151) 
-0.035 
(0.128) 
Fertility 
(Differenced) 
-3.08 
(2.20) 
-.051 
(.039) 
3.00 
(1.88) 
-.564 
(1.99) 
-1.75 
(2.20) 
.801 
(1.21) 
-0.019 
(0.574) 
Fertility (Lagged) 
 
-0.649** 
(0.285) 
-.002 
(.003) 
-.457*** 
(.154) 
-.688*** 
(.234) 
-.665*** 
(.158) 
-.197* 
(.110) 
0.183** 
(0.086) 
Logged GDP per 
capita (Differenced) 
1.951 
(2.10) 
.085* 
(.049) 
5.65** 
(2.27) 
2.46 
(2.32) 
-.859 
(2.11) 
4.11** 
(1.69) 
-1.07 
(0.888) 
Logged GDP per 
capita (Lagged) 
-0.097 
(0.225) 
.001 
(.004) 
.303 
(.219) 
-.798** 
(.341) 
.041 
(.136) 
.197 
(.177) 
0.107 
(0.139) 
Logged Population 
Density 
(Differenced) 
5.53 
(21.2) 
.054 
(.341) 
18.1 
(17.4) 
46.9* 
(25.1) 
11.7 
(15.0) 
.405 
(15.5) 
-17.0* 
(9.70) 
Logged Population 
Density (Lagged) 
-0.065 
(0.100) 
-.001 
(.001) 
.035 
(.092) 
.241 
(.151) 
-.070 
(.063) 
-.118** 
(.056) 
-0.057 
(0.042) 
Urban Population 
(Differenced) 
-0.058 
(0.439) 
.008 
(.006) 
.310 
(.305) 
-.076 
(.313) 
.137 
(.197) 
-.267* 
(.138) 
0.119 
(0.117) 
Urban Population 
(Lagged) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
-.00003 
(.0002) 
.0005 
(.009) 
-.006 
(.014) 
.005 
(.007) 
.007 
(.007) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
R² .079 .020 .037 .111 .045 .129 .141 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.  All tests are 2-tailed.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
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Table 5:  Results of the Primary Models with Outliers Eliminated 
(Error Correction Models with random effects, robust standard errors, and regional dummies, and with the dependent 
variable limited to two standard deviations from its mean.) 
Variable Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
 
Y= Diff. 
Primary 
Completion 
Rate 
(N=1232, 
120 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Primary 
School 
Teachers 
(N=1450, 
130 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Preprimary 
Enrollment 
Rate 
(N=1721, 124 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Primary 
Enrollment 
Rate 
(N=1981, 131 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Secondary 
Enrollment 
Rate 
(N=1743, 130 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Tertiary 
Enrollment 
Rate 
(N=1538, 126 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Children 
Out of 
School 
(N=1228, 
113 
countries) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable 
-.053*** 
(.010) 
-.010*** 
(.006) 
-.008* 
(.004) 
-.028*** 
(.006) 
-.015*** 
(.005) 
.008** 
(.003) 
-.044*** 
(.011) 
Democratic 
Decentralization, 
Party Centralization 
(Lagged) 
.450** 
(.203) 
.007** 
(.004) 
.325* 
(.175) 
.313 
(.220) 
.313** 
(.141) 
.016 
(.103) 
-.099 
(.074) 
Municipal Plurality 
(Lagged) 
.010 
(.237) 
-.002 
(.005) 
-.231 
(.223) 
-.053 
(.252) 
-.221 
(.156) 
-.010 
(.136) 
.012 
(.052) 
Municipal Directly 
Elected Executive 
(Lagged) 
-.057 
(.191) 
 
.006 
(.004) 
.081 
(.204) 
.275 
(.205) 
-.023 
(.169) 
.257** 
(.114) 
-.078 
(.068) 
Fertility 
(Differenced) 
-2.12 
(1.86) 
-.044 
(.028) 
2.13* 
(1.18) 
-.006 
(1.21) 
-1.96 
(1.47) 
.327 
(1.05) 
-.465 
(.360) 
Fertility (Lagged) 
 
-.220 
(.173) 
-.005* 
(.003) 
-.134 
(.121) 
-.123 
(.128) 
-.474*** 
(.127) 
-.195** 
(.094) 
.063 
(.047) 
Logged GDP per 
capita (Differenced) 
.412 
(1.90) 
.055 
(.033) 
4.30** 
(1.77) 
2.02 
(1.31) 
.330 
(1.65) 
2.67** 
(1.28) 
-.118 
(.366) 
Logged GDP per 
capita (Lagged) 
-.036 
(.189) 
.003 
(.005) 
.159 
(.169) 
-.511*** 
(.168) 
-.082 
(.140) 
.091 
(.120) 
.050 
(.050) 
Logged Population 
Density (Differenced) 
-3.48 
(19.4) 
.126 
(.258) 
6.16 
(13.3) 
12.7 
(12.1) 
5.71 
(12.0) 
-1.77 
(11.2) 
-5.97** 
(2.78) 
Logged Population 
Density (Lagged) 
.010 
(.067) 
.001 
(.002) 
-.106 
(.081) 
-.008 
(.077) 
-.084 
(.055) 
-.089* 
(.046) 
.016 
(.019) 
Urban Population 
(Differenced) 
-.005 
(.345) 
.001 
(.005) 
.577** 
(.265) 
-.168 
(.223) 
.120 
(.181) 
-.127 
(.112) 
-.022 
(.043) 
Urban Population 
(Lagged) 
.006 
(.009) 
-.0001 
(.0002) 
.003 
(.006) 
.002 
(.007) 
-.001 
(.005) 
.001 
(.003) 
.002 
(.003) 
R² .085 .020 .071 .111 .051 .182 .117 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.  All tests are 2-tailed.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
 
Results 
The quantitative results provide strong support for our hypothesis.  Beginning with the primary 
models in Table 4, the Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization variable is significant in four of 
the seven models and in the expected direction but not significant in the other three.  Note that we have 
estimated models with all of the theoretically relevant education variables that are available for a wide 
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swath of countries and found in World Bank (2010).  Note also that the various models differ significantly 
in the number of N’s included, the specific observations, and in the nature of the dependent variable.  For 
these reasons, the consistency of the results across the seven models is quite striking and indicates that 
countries enjoying both democratic decentralization and party centralization tend to produce better 
educational outcomes.  Moreover, when the models are rerun using pooled OLS and country-clustered 
standard errors, the primary results are largely unchanged.  The only significant difference that arises with 
the new estimator is that the Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization variable comes closer to 
statistical significance in the Children Out of School Model (p=.114).  And the size of these predicted 
effects is also worthy of consideration.  Model 1, for instance, estimates that the combination of democratic 
decentralization and party centralization causes an increase in differenced primary school enrollment of 
nearly half a percent, or a little more than one-tenth of a standard deviation.   
 Table 5 presents the results of the primary models with their outliers dropped, i.e. restricted only to 
observations where the dependent variable is within two standard deviations above or below its mean.  The 
results of the primary independent variable hold fully, and the variable’s statistical significance is in fact 
strengthened in the Primary School Teachers model.
18
  Indeed, of the seven dependent variables considered 
in our models, it is only in one case – Primary Enrollment Rate – that our primary independent variable 
never achieves or comes close to achieving statistical significance.  Why might that be the case?  We 
                                                          
18
In Table 6, located in our online appendix for space reasons, we also present models with the expenditure and revenue 
decentralization variable included.  We estimate these models separately because the fiscal decentralization variables are missing 
for many observations and severely restrict our N’s.  Here again, the Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization variable 
is in the expected direction in all models, but it retains significance in two of the seven (including, for the first time, Tertiary 
Enrollment Rate). In our judgment, the fact that the primary variable remains significant in two of the models and is always in 
the expected direction, despite the greatly restricted sample size, represents at least moderately strong confirmatory evidence for 
our argument. The most striking finding related to the fiscal decentralization variables is that the impact of expenditure 
decentralization on educational provision tends to be negative (especially in the short-run), while the impact of revenue 
decentralization tends to be positive. Perhaps this is an indication that the devolution of expenditure powers without the ability to 
raise money independently does not produce the expected gains; under these conditions, local governments struggle in the short 
run to develop the capacity to manage devolved funds.  The presence in only one model of a negative long-term relationship 
between expenditure decentralization and educational outcomes is evidence that these problems often are eventually resolved.   
On the other hand, the ability of local governments to raise revenue is perhaps a better measure of their genuine independence 
and responsibility, and therefore more associated with a more accountable public goods provision. Indeed, a number of scholars 
have argued that the hypothesized benefits of decentralization only accrue when sub-national governments have the power to 
raise their own revenues (see, for example, Weingast (2009) and Rodden (2003).  
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suspect that the greater (although far from perfect) universality of primary education means that political 
factors such as the ones we consider will impact its provision less dramatically that the provision of, say, 
preprimary or secondary education. 
 Which control variables matter for educational outcomes?  Perhaps the most interesting findings are 
that (1) municipalities with plurality electoral systems tend to see weaker improvements in the provision of 
educational public goods, while (2) municipalities with directly elected executives (mayors) tend to see 
stronger improvements.
19
  These relationships do not appear in all of the models, but they are common 
enough to suggest some support for the prior literature on the benefits of direct election and electoral 
proportionality.   
In evaluating the economic and social control variables, it is important to remember that the lagged 
variables represent long-term effects on the change in the dependent variable while the differenced 
variables represent short term effects.  Turning to the Fertility variables, higher levels of fertility are 
associated with a long-term trend toward lower educational provision, as expected.  The short-term impact 
of Fertility is much less in evidence, which stands to reason given the time that it takes shifts in fertility to 
impact educational demand.   The results also indicate that increases in differenced GDP per capita are 
associated with improvements in education.  It is worth noting, however, that the lagged (long-term) 
measure of GDP per capita is associated in several models with weaker improvement in public goods 
provision.  This combination of results likely indicates that short-term improvements in economic growth 
will translate into improved educational outcomes, but that, over the long term, rich countries will stop 
seeing educational improvements after they have achieved a certain level.  In other words, poor but 
growing economies can expect more dramatic educational improvements than rich but stagnant ones.  It is 
also worth noting that the only model where long-term high GDP per capita improves outcomes is the 
Tertiary Enrollment Rate.  This finding is not surprising, given that countries are less likely to achieve full 
                                                          
19
 Note that a negative sign in the Children Out of School models indicates a better public goods outcome.  Note also that the 
negative effect of plurality elections is most apparent in the models in Table 6, found in the appendix. 
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enrollment in tertiary education after a certain level of development than they are in primary or secondary 
education. 
There is evidence of the short-term benefits of higher Population Density on improving educational 
outcomes, as expected.  This effect is enhanced because increases in population are likely translate (albeit 
indirectly) into a larger denominator for some of the dependent variables. In the long-run, however, high 
Population Density seems to have a negative impact on tertiary enrollment.  This result could be because 
countries that are already quite dense experience weaker improvements in tertiary education.  The short-
term impact of Urban Population is surprising, where it shows up in one Preprimary Enrollment model as 
positive, and in one Tertiary Enrollment Rate model as negative.  This result may indicate that more 
increasingly urbanized societies are more likely to provide the somewhat unusual service of preschool 
education, but this growth in urbanization can also indicate economic and social weaknesses that may 
inhibit other forms of educational provision.  But in the final analysis, differenced Urban Population is not 
significant in enough models to draw a clear conclusion. 
 What can we say to summarize the results?  The benefits of combining democratic decentralization 
with party centralization are well borne out in our empirical analysis.  The Democratic Decentralization, 
Party Centralization variable is statistically significant in eight of the fourteen models, and it is always in 
the expected direction.  Its lack of significance in some of the models may give pause in making final 
judgments.  That said, the indicator shows up as significant across models using two different estimators, it 
is able to explain at least five very different measures of educational attainment, and it is robust to vastly 
different combinations of country-years.   Given the difficulty of measuring educational outcomes, 
particularly in the developing world, and given the complexity and specificity of local politics in different 
countries, the robustness of the results provided here are notable.  That said, our theory and others that draw 
general lessons from sub-national political institutions will continue to require refinement in the light of 
ongoing empirical tests.  
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Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine which types of political institutions may be necessary to deliver the gains from 
decentralization predicted by much of the literature. We begin by developing a formal extension and 
refinement of the decentralization theorem of Oates (1972), which has provided the basis for much past 
research.  Assuming inter-jurisdiction spillovers (something Oates did not do), we develop a “strong 
decentralization theorem” which indicates the potential superiority of sub-national governance even in the 
presence of externalities.  An important implication of our theoretical model is that the combination of 
democratic decentralization and party centralization tends to produce the most efficient provision of public 
goods.  Democratic decentralization ensures that local governments are responsive to the desires of their 
constituents, while party centralization incentivizes local leaders to pay for goods that may have spillover 
benefits.   
 To test our argument empirically, we create a large dataset on sub-national political institutions and 
use it to estimate a series of cross-national empirical analysis of educational outcomes.    Our dataset is, to 
our knowledge, the first to compile measures of sub-national political institutions across a large set of 
countries. Our empirical findings provide strong support for our hypotheses.  They show that the 
combination of municipal elections and party centralization tends to improve educational outcomes.   
Our ultimate goal in this paper is to understand better how the growing influence of sub-national 
fiscal decentralization may impact the everyday lives of citizens around the world depending on the 
arrangements used for political decentralization.  There is much additional research to be done, not least in 
refining our theory on the role of decentralized political institutions and applying it to new policy areas. 
This paper also shows the potential of merging political science and economics into broader approaches to 
explore the inter-connected dynamics of decentralized governance.  
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Appendix 
Lemma 1 Local public goods are Pareto efficient for an economy with a majoritarian electoral system, 
single member districts, a single unit of government, a centralized party system, and for              
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Lemma 2 Party centralization in a system of local governments leads to a set of Pareto efficient local 
public goods    
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Theorem 1 The provision of local public goods with and without inter-regional spillovers by a system of 
local governments welfare-dominates the centralized provision. 
Proof 
It is simple to verify that conditions (2), (4) and (6) imply        
    
  for       
    
         
                 
      
      
     and   
     
     
     . By the strict concavity of 
            
    
                   on the constrained policy space   feasible  
                
                     
 
       
 
 
         
  and                 such that         
                        . Note                                         
NSW   which implies            >       NSW  . We take       1      ⟶0  
                   
       
   
 
       
    
 to show 
               
       
   
 
       
    
                               
Without of loss of generality, set                       where      and       are global maximizers of 
    and    is some feasible                 then it is satisfied that 
        
   
 
        
    
 
                                                . Therefore conditions (2), (4) and (6) mean 
   
     and    
      and hence        
          
  . 
 
 
 Rethinking the Political Economy of Decentralization 51 
Lemma 3 For economies with a decentralized party system and a nationwide single government 
representing voters of all districts, a uniform and Pareto efficient local public good          
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provided such that it satisfies the following: 
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  is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability of voting for party z in the 
nationwide general election, 
   
  
   
   , and the change in well being of voters from an increase in the provision 
of the local public good  
   
  
   
. 
Proof 
For an economy with party decentralization and a nationwide government, party   designs public 
spending to maximize   
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Use (28), (29), and (30) into (27) to obtain the expression in (20)20 
           
    
  
     
      
     
 
                 
     
    
  
    
  
  
     
       
     
      
                           
   
 
Lemma 4 For economies with party decentralization and a system of local governments representing 
voters of each district, local public goods    
            are provided such that    
   
 satisfies the following: 
       
    
    
      
                        
     
    
  
    
  
    
      
              
               
Where 
     
    
  
    
  
 
    
  
   
  
       
    
   
  
   
  
   
       
                                    
is a weighted rate of substitution between marginal changes in the party´s plurality in the district´s 
primary and the general local election, and 
  
    
    
  
   
  
       
   
   
   
  
   
  
  
   
  
    
  
  
    
  
   
  
       
    
   
  
   
  
   
       
              
is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability that voter type    votes for party z in the local 
general election in district i, 
   
  
   
   , and the change in the well being of voters from an increase in the 
provision of the local public good  
   
  
    
  . 
Proof 
In a federation with party decentralization, the spending policy of party z in district   is    
    
           
       
      
     
   .21 The first order condition of the party´s problem is  
    
  
    
  
    
  
    
  
    
    
  
   
  
   
  
    
  
       
                                                
                                                          
20
 Equivalent to expression (16) of Lemma 3 in the paper. 
21
 Since the policies of candidates      and      
 
 converge, we re-define     
        
         
   . 
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From definition,    
            
     
   
      
        and   
          
    
  
     
      
 
for        . Obtain 
    
      
       
      
      , and re-arrange terms to re-express (35) as follows 
 
    
  
   
  
       
       
    
   
  
   
  
   
  
    
  
     
    
  
    
  
         
     
    
  
    
  
    
  
    
  
                  
From the definition of the covariance between   and  ,                      . Re-define 
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     for       to express the following 
       
    
   
  
   
  
   
  
    
  
     
   
   
   
  
   
  
 
   
  
    
  
           
    
   
  
   
  
             
    
   
  
    
  
                      
Where   
   
   
  
   
   
   
  
    
     is the covariance between    
     
    and the voter´s marginal well being, 
   
      
   , due to a change in the provision of the local public good in district  . Use conditions 
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 and substitute (37) into (36) to 
establish 
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To express condition (38) as follows 
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Theorem 2 The Decentralization Theorem holds in Majoritarian democracies with a decentralized party 
system, open primaries, and single member districts. 
Proof 
For the economy with party decentralization and a system of local governments, the politically optimal 
policy for party   in each district is    
            satisfying:  
       
    
  
      
                        
     
    
  
    
  
  
      
              
              
Under open primaries, the distribution of preferences over policy of voters voting in the primary is the 
same as the distribution of preferences of voters voting in the general election. Therefore,        
         and     
      
         
      
        . In this case, the parties’ policies converge, therefore    
   
   
     ,   
     
            , 
    
     
   
           
   
    
   
            where       are positive 
constants. Hence    
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       . Moreover,     
      and   
      for         
leading to  
    
     
   
   
    
     
   
            and the following conditions hold: 
       
    
   
  
   
  
        
     
    
                                          
 Since       
    
      measures the proportion of voters in the local election, and 
     
    
  
    
  
 
    
  
   
  
       
    
   
  
   
  
   
       
                                   
Use (43) and (44) into (42) and re-arrange terms to show that the first order condition for    
           
satisfies the following condition:  
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Now consider an economy with party decentralization in open primaries and a nationwide government. 
By (16) in Lemma 3 (which is equivalent to condition 20), the characterization of the first order condition 
for this economy with   
     is given by: 
           
    
  
     
      
     
 
                 
     
    
  
    
  
  
     
       
     
      
                               
In this equilibrium, the parties’ policies also converge then   
     
  and following similar steps as those 
shown above imply that the first order condition in (46) can be expressed as follows:  
       
    
  
     
                
     
  
      
                                   
Moreover, recall from condition (2) that                                
    
             is is the 
global maximizer of the aggregate well being of residents of district   such that it is satisfied22 
       
    
  
                                                                       
Therefore 
       
    
                    
    
                                             
Without loss of generality, the heterogeneity of preferences of voters for public goods means     
    .23 Moreover, conditions (45) and (2) imply that    
           , and the expressions in (47) and (48) 
imply    
      
     
   . These outcomes and condition (49) means  
                                                          
22
 See that condition (45) is equivalent  to condition (2). 
23
 The heterogeneity of preferences means that, in general,          or         . For the purpose of our analysis, and 
without loss of generality,  we assume           
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Theorem 3 The Decentralization Theorem does not hold in Majoritarian democracies with single member 
districts and decentralized party systems with closed primaries. 
Proof 
A party   seeking to form a central government in politically decentralized regimes with closed primaries 
selects   
            
     
     
    
   subject to   
      
       
  . By proposition 2,      
              
    
                 where      is the policy that maximizes the nationwide surplus from 
the fiscal exchange associated with a local public good in district  . Condition (20) of Lemma 3 and 
condition (2) from proposition 2 imply that, in general,   
          . Similarly, in a system of local 
governments with party decentralization and closed primaries, party   selects    
               
      . 
Condition (32) from Lemma 3 and condition (2) from proposition 2 show that, in general,    
           . As 
a result, in general, the nationwide aggregate wellbeing of voters satisfies the following 
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Table 6:  Results of the Primary Models with Fiscal Decentralization Controls  
(Error Correction Models with random effects, robust standard errors, and regional dummies) 
 
Variable Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
 
Y= Diff. 
Primary 
Completion 
Rate 
(N=348, 48 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Primary 
School 
Teachers 
(N=391, 50 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Preprimary 
Enrollment 
Rate 
(N=653, 57 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Primary 
Enrollment 
Rate 
(N=669, 57 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Secondary 
Enrollment 
Rate 
(N=660,  54 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Tertiary 
Enrollment 
Rate 
(N=618, 54 
countries) 
Y= Diff. 
Children 
Out of 
School 
(N=406, 
42 
countries) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable 
-.192** 
(.083) 
-.031** 
(.012) 
-.049*** 
(.013) 
-.076*** 
(.022) 
-.024* 
(.013) 
.015 
(.011) 
-.151*** 
(.036) 
Democratic 
Decentralization, 
Party Centralization 
(Lagged) 
.522 
(.595) 
.002 
(.010) 
.763** 
(.304) 
.151 
(.194) 
.352 
(.338) 
.449* 
(.257) 
-.104 
(.082) 
Municipal Plurality 
(Lagged) 
-.528 
(.427) 
-.001 
(.012) 
-1.17** 
(.472) 
-.326* 
(.194) 
-.578* 
(.343) 
-.455 
(.341) 
.107 
(.081) 
Municipal Directly 
Elected Executive 
(Lagged) 
-.436 
(.510) 
-.009 
(.011) 
.049 
(.346) 
.282 
(.196) 
.023 
(.311) 
.111 
(.319) 
-.210** 
(.087) 
Fertility 
(Differenced) 
-2.99 
(4.58) 
.017 
(.100) 
2.91 
(3.23) 
.319 
(1.74) 
-.097 
(4.97) 
-.801 
(1.62) 
-.011 
(.696) 
Fertility (Lagged) 
 
-.335 
(.506) 
-.008 
(.012) 
-1.00** 
(.422) 
.038 
(.236) 
-.171 
(.298) 
-.392* 
(.220) 
.003 
(.109) 
Logged GDP per 
capita (Differenced) 
1.71 
(4.46) 
.018 
(.080) 
5.19 
(3.77) 
6.43 
(5.03) 
1.42 
(3.77) 
6.36** 
(2.91) 
.459 
(1.01) 
Logged GDP per 
capita (Lagged) 
.583 
(.555) 
.006 
(.011) 
.626 
(.473) 
-.428* 
(.227) 
.588 
(.394) 
.529** 
(.253) 
-.071 
(.093) 
Logged Population 
Density 
(Differenced) 
-64.6 
(40.2) 
-.518 
(.788) 
32.8 
(35.4) 
5.41 
(22.2) 
15.1 
(28.4) 
-28.2 
(21.1) 
-.364 
(9.48) 
Logged Population 
Density (Lagged) 
-.086 
(.278) 
.011* 
(.006) 
-.049 
(.197) 
-.067 
(.078) 
-.098 
(.119) 
-.237** 
(.110) 
-.026 
(.033) 
Urban Population 
(Differenced) 
-1.52* 
(.887) 
.002 
(.026) 
-1.06 
(.663) 
.206 
(.542) 
.193 
(.595) 
-.493 
(.310) 
.073 
(.135) 
Urban Population 
(Lagged) 
.002 
(.035) 
.0003 
(.0007) 
-.003 
(.019) 
.021** 
(.008) 
.020 
(.020) 
-.002 
(.010) 
-.005 
(.004) 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
(Differenced) 
-3.55 
(10.2) 
-.243 
(.287) 
3.42 
(11.2) 
-12.2* 
(6.56) 
-22.8** 
(11.2) 
-11.5* 
(6.60) 
-.820 
(1.68) 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
(Lagged) 
-18.8 
(14.7) 
.015 
(.183) 
4.25 
(3.80) 
3.19 
(2.50) 
-9.87** 
(4.09) 
-3.21 
(2.90) 
.212 
(.601) 
Revenue 
Decentralization 
(Differenced) 
12.5 
(14.2) 
.292 
(.287) 
-10.3 
(11.2) 
13.6 
(8.39) 
18.2* 
(9.74) 
14.1** 
(6.93) 
-4.03* 
(2.25) 
Revenue 
Decentralization 
(Lagged) 
18.4 
(15.4) 
.057 
(.184) 
-7.90* 
(4.05) 
-3.50 
(2.50) 
10.8** 
(4.57) 
1.17 
(3.13) 
-.116 
(.634) 
R² .145 .041 .091 .051 .050 .145 .155 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.  All tests are 2-tailed.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
  
 
